Legal
Security
This page describes how to report a security issue in JustBrowser, what we do to protect your data, and what we do not yet do. It is written for people who work with security. It contains no claims we cannot back up: where a control does not exist yet, this page says so.
1. Who we are and what this page covers
JustBrowser (the "Service") is operated by Velocity Digital Labs, LLC, 1111B S Governors Ave #52122, Dover, DE 19904, United States ("we", "us"). "You" means the person reading this page, whether you are a customer or a security researcher.
The Service consists of the desktop application for Windows x64 and macOS (Apple Silicon), the web dashboard and API at justbrowser.app, and the cloud sync, team, sharing and proxy marketplace features that run behind them. There is no Linux build.
This page is a statement of practice, not a contract. Your use of the Service is governed by the Terms of Service at /terms and the Acceptable Use Policy at /acceptable-use. How we handle personal data is described in the Privacy Policy at /privacy.
2. Reporting a vulnerability
If you believe you have found a security vulnerability in the Service, we want to hear about it. Please report it to us before disclosing it to anyone else.
2.1 Where to send a report
Send reports by email to security@justbrowser.app. Do not use any address on a justbrowser.com domain; that domain does not belong to us and mail sent there does not reach us.
We do not publish a PGP key, so we cannot accept encrypted email. If your report contains material you are not comfortable sending in plain text, send a short message first describing the class of issue and we will agree a secure channel with you.
2.2 What to include
A useful report lets us reproduce the issue without guessing. Please include as much of the following as you can:
- Which part of the Service is affected: the website or dashboard at justbrowser.app, the API under justbrowser.app/api, or the desktop application (and on which platform and version).
- A description of the vulnerability and the impact you believe it has.
- Step-by-step instructions to reproduce it, including any request or response captures, screenshots, or a minimal proof-of-concept.
- Any account identifiers or test data you used, so we can find the activity in our logs.
- How you would like to be credited, if at all, and whether we may contact you with follow-up questions.
2.3 What we commit to
- We will acknowledge receipt of your report.
- We will investigate it and tell you whether we have confirmed the issue.
- We will keep you informed of our progress until the issue is resolved or we have decided not to act on it, and we will explain why in the latter case.
- We will not take legal action against you, or refer you to law enforcement, for research carried out in good faith under section 2.4.
- We will credit you on request once the issue is fixed, if you want to be credited.
2.4 Safe harbour
We consider security research conducted in line with this page to be authorised. We will not pursue civil claims or support criminal prosecution against you for such research. The Terms of Service at /terms and the Acceptable Use Policy at /acceptable-use each contain an express exception for good-faith security research that complies with this page, to the extent the research stays within the scope this page describes, so such research is not a breach of the Terms (including the reverse-engineering restriction) or of the Acceptable Use Policy. If a third party starts legal action against you for research that complied with this page, we will make it known that your activity was authorised.
To stay within this safe harbour, you must:
- Act in good faith to avoid privacy violations, destruction of data, and interruption or degradation of the Service.
- Only test against accounts, profiles and data that you own or have explicit permission to test. Do not access, modify or download data belonging to other users. If you encounter another user's data by accident, stop, do not retain it, and tell us in your report.
- Not use a vulnerability beyond what is needed to demonstrate it. Do not pivot, persist, or escalate once you have proof.
- Not disclose the issue publicly, or to any third party, until we have confirmed it is fixed or we have agreed a disclosure date with you.
- Not demand payment or any other benefit as a condition of disclosing the issue.
- Comply with all applicable laws.
2.5 In scope
- The website and web dashboard at justbrowser.app, including authentication, team workspaces, profile sharing, cloud sync and the proxy marketplace.
- The API under justbrowser.app/api.
- The JustBrowser desktop application for Windows x64 and macOS (Apple Silicon), including its local REST API, its handling of proxy credentials and saved logins, and its sync and update mechanisms.
- The installers we distribute from justbrowser.app.
2.6 Out of scope
The following are not in scope. Reports limited to these areas will not be acted on and are not covered by the safe harbour in section 2.4.
- Third-party proxy providers, including DataImpulse and Oxylabs, and any infrastructure they operate. Report issues in their services to them directly.
- Our other sub-processors (Railway, Amazon Web Services, Stripe, JustEmails, Cloudflare), except where the issue is caused by our own configuration of their service.
- Google Analytics, which we use to measure how our website is used, except where the issue is caused by our own configuration of it.
- Denial-of-service or resource-exhaustion testing of any kind, including rate-limit exhaustion.
- Social engineering, phishing or physical attacks against our staff, contractors or users.
- Reports that depend on a user having an already-compromised device, browser or account.
- Automated scanner output without a demonstrated, reproducible impact.
- Findings about how profiles appear to websites, platforms, fingerprint-checking sites or other systems that try to identify or classify them (for example, that a particular checking site scores a profile a certain way). These are product issues, not security vulnerabilities; send them to legal@justbrowser.app.
2.7 No bug bounty
We do not run a bug bounty programme and we do not pay for vulnerability reports. We may say thank you and credit you publicly, but you should not expect a reward. We say this plainly so that you can decide whether to spend your time here.
3. What we do today
This section describes the controls that exist in the Service as of the date at the top of this page. It is limited to what we actually do.
3.1 Transport
All traffic between the desktop application or your browser and justbrowser.app is carried over TLS, as is traffic from the Service to Stripe, Amazon S3 and JustEmails.
3.2 Encryption keys, proxy credentials, saved logins and 2FA secrets
Proxy credentials and saved logins stored by the desktop application are encrypted with AES-256-GCM using a per-account key rather than a per-device key, and so is a profile's 2FA secret in sync archives and profile summaries. This is what allows a synced profile to be opened on a second machine that is signed in to the same account. Our server derives that key from your account id and a server-side secret and sends it to the app after you sign in, so it is not an end-to-end key: it protects these fields where they are stored encrypted, but we could reconstruct it.
The sign-ins the browser saves in each profile (its cookies, and the passwords, addresses and cards it saves) are encrypted with a key derived from your per-account key. Before the people a profile is shared with can open its sign-ins, the profile is moved to a key for that profile alone, derived from your per-account key and the profile's identifier, so the key they receive opens that profile only. Our server can derive these keys too; it does so only to send a profile's key, over TLS, to the app of a person the profile is shared with, when they open it. They are not end-to-end keys either.
When you share a profile with a team, the app also sends us that profile's proxy login (protocol, host, port, username and password) so the team's members can open the profile through the same proxy. We store it encrypted with AES-256-GCM under a server-held key, separate from the per-account key, and send it only to members of that team who may open the profile; their app keeps its username and password encrypted with their own account key. A profile you share directly with another user carries its proxy login the same way: we send it only to that person, and delete it when the share ends. Our server can decrypt these logins; it does not write them to its logs.
The saved logins and 2FA secrets of profiles you share travel the same way: your app sends them, we store them encrypted under the same server-held key, send them only to the people who may open the profile, and delete our copy when the share ends. Anyone who obtained that one key could read all three kinds of secret; our server decrypts them only to send them and does not write them to its logs.
The application keeps a copy of the account key on your computer, protected by the macOS Keychain or Windows' data protection (DPAPI), so your profiles open while our server cannot be reached; it is removed when you sign out or switch accounts.
If the application cannot obtain the account key (for example it is started offline before its first sign-in completes), it falls back to a key derived from the install path and machine hostname, and re-encrypts that data with the account key the next time it fetches one.
The local SQLite database that the desktop application keeps on your computer is not encrypted as a whole. It is a local file under your control, protected by your operating system's user account and disk encryption if you have enabled it. Anyone with read access to your user account on that machine can read the unencrypted parts of it.
3.3 Cloud sync archives
When you enable sync, the desktop application uploads an archive of the profile to Amazon Web Services S3 in the us-east-1 region. These archives contain the profile's browser data: its cookies and sessions, the passwords, addresses and payment cards saved in the browser, its history, bookmarks, extensions and site permissions, and its browser storage. They are therefore sensitive. They are stored with S3 server-side encryption (AES-256). We do not open or read the contents of sync archives; that is our choice, not a technical limit, since our server can derive the keys that open the sign-ins saved in them (section 3.2).
Alongside each archive we store a profile summary in our database so that your other devices can list the profile before downloading it. The summary holds the profile name, notes, tags, folder names, fingerprint settings, proxy host, port and username, the site addresses and usernames of saved logins, and the label of its 2FA secret, with proxy and saved-login passwords and the 2FA secret in encrypted form.
An archive is deleted when you delete the profile, and the profile's name and summary are cleared in the same database write; a minimal deletion record (ids, deletion time, storage key, size, checksum) remains so the deletion propagates to your other devices. The profile then stays in the app's Recently deleted list on your other devices for 30 days, so it can be restored there, and is then deleted from them. You can delete your account from Settings in the web dashboard; it takes effect immediately, cancels any active subscription, and removes your sync archives and every record that belongs to the account. The trial card fingerprint is retained (see the Privacy Policy).
3.4 Local REST API
The desktop application exposes a local REST API of 108 endpoints for automation. It is enabled by default and can be turned off in Settings. It is bound to 127.0.0.1 only, so it does not accept connections from other machines on your network, and every request except the unauthenticated GET /health check must carry a bearer token. Any process running under your user account on the same machine can reach it if it has the token; treat the token as a secret.
The local API token is separate from the API tokens you can create in the web dashboard. Dashboard-issued tokens authenticate calls to our cloud API; we keep only a one-way hash of each, and its first 12 characters, against your account, together with the time each was last used, and the token itself is shown to you once, when you create it. The local token stays on your machine.
3.5 Payments
Payments are processed by Stripe. Card numbers are entered directly into Stripe and never reach our servers. We store only Stripe customer and subscription identifiers and, because we offer one trial per person, the opaque card fingerprint token Stripe issues for the card used to start a trial, so that we can tell whether a card has already been used for one. That token is not the card number and cannot be turned back into one. We may decline a trial, or end one early, where the account or the payment card has already been used for a trial. How long we keep the token is stated in the Privacy Policy at /privacy.
3.6 Sign-in sessions
Only the desktop application registers sign-in sessions. Each desktop installation that signs in to your account registers a device session, recorded with the IP address it connected from, its user agent, the device name and operating system, the JustBrowser version, and when it was last seen. You can see these under Devices with a session, in the web dashboard's settings, each with the IP address it signed in from, and sign out any device, or all of them. When you sign a device out, our servers refuse its sign-in from that moment, and the application on that device signs itself out at its next check-in: about a minute later while it is online, or when it reconnects. A device signed in with a version of the application older than 2.0 is refused at once when you sign out all devices; signing out that device alone reaches it at its next check-in. A revoked device drops out of the list after 7 days and its record is deleted 30 days after revocation; a device that has not checked in for 90 days is deleted. These purges run when your account next registers a device or a device checks in; there is no scheduled job.
When we turn away another copy of a desktop's sign-in (for example from a cloned virtual machine or a restored backup), we note on that device's session when this last happened, how many times it happened and the IP address it came from, and show the note on that device in the Devices with a session list; it is deleted 90 days after the last time, or with the session record if that is sooner.
From version 2.0, the application names each run of itself with a random identifier, so two copies of one computer's app data used at the same time (for example a cloned virtual machine) are told apart: the later one signs out on that computer only and signs in again as a device of its own, and only one of them can open a cloud profile at a time. If such a copy signs in as a device of its own and nothing else uses the earlier device's session for 10 minutes, we sign that session out automatically; the list shows it, among the recently signed-out devices, as replaced by a copy of its app data. The identifiers are deleted 2 days after a run was last seen (Privacy Policy, section 2.4).
Web-dashboard sign-ins are separate. The dashboard uses a signed session cookie with no server-side session record, so the list shows only the browser you are viewing it in (as "This browser"), not your dashboard sign-ins in other browsers, and those cannot be cancelled remotely. That cookie expires 30 days after last use; signing out deletes it from that browser. When you register an account we also log the IP address, user agent and email address of the registration request.
If you suspect your account has been accessed by someone else, change your password (or the password of the OAuth provider you sign in with), sign out all devices, sign out of the dashboard in every browser you have used, then contact us.
3.7 Authentication and cookies
Authentication is handled with Auth.js. In normal use, Auth.js sets three cookies, all strictly necessary for sign-in and session handling: __Host-authjs.csrf-token and __Secure-authjs.callback-url, which last for the browser session, and __Secure-authjs.session-token, which expires 30 days after your last visit and is extended each time you use the dashboard. A fourth cookie, __Secure-authjs.pkce.code_verifier, is set for up to 15 minutes only while a Google sign-in is in progress. Our own code sets one more, jb_dg_nonce, for up to 10 minutes only while a Google sign-in started from the desktop app is in progress.
The website sets three other kinds of first-party cookie. One remembers your Google Analytics choice for 6 months. Where Google Analytics runs, it sets _ga and _ga_TVZHQ99TZW, which are not strictly necessary. In the United Kingdom, Switzerland and the EEA (including EU territories with their own country code), and wherever we cannot tell which country you are in, Google Analytics runs only after you accept it. Elsewhere, it runs unless you turn it off in Cookie settings. It never runs if your browser sends a Global Privacy Control or Do Not Track signal. Google Analytics also never runs on /check or /newtab (the pages the desktop application opens inside your profiles), on /reset-password, /invite/…, /verify-email, /unsubscribe, /checkout/pay or /fingerprint-checker, on any address containing token= or totp=, or on any address whose next or callbackUrl parameter points to an invitation or password-reset page. Cloudflare Web Analytics, which also runs on the website, sets no cookies. Where Stripe's forms are shown (a checkout, or changing your card on the Billing page; in the desktop app, its checkout, Change card and Complete payment), Stripe's script sets two cookies of its own on justbrowser.app, and the frames of Stripe's forms set up to three third-party cookies, on m.stripe.com and hcaptcha.com, all to prevent fraud; if you use Link, Stripe sets two more of its own (Cookie Policy, Section 2.4). There are no other first-party cookies and no advertising cookies on the website, and as of the date at the top of this page no infrastructure provider sets a cookie on it. Details are at /cookies.
3.8 Team workspaces and sharing
Team seats are free and unlimited. A seat is not a licence. A team member may open the profiles the workspace owner has shared into the workspace, and every member of the workspace sees the same shared set; a seat may also keep up to 5 profiles of its own on each device, without cloud sync. A seat cannot see the owner's unshared profiles, cannot sync profiles of its own, cannot create API tokens and cannot re-share. Direct user-to-user sharing is per profile and per recipient, with view-only or launch permission as the owner chooses. Membership and invitations are visible to the workspace owner in the dashboard. We keep a history of what happens to each cloud profile and to each team, which the profile's owner and the team's owner and admins can see in the app (section 2.12 of the Privacy Policy). When a member closes a profile shared with the team, its session is saved to the owner's synced copy, one person at a time; direct shares stay one-way. A profile shared with a team, or directly with a person who may open it, travels as it is: its signed-in sessions, the passwords saved in the browser, and the saved logins and 2FA secret kept for it in JustBrowser, so anyone who can open it can use every account signed in to it. A view-only share opens nothing.
3.9 What we do not collect
The desktop application sends us no usage analytics or telemetry. When something in it fails, it sends us an error report: what failed in the application, its version and the operating system, made only of parts that cannot hold the names of your profiles, your paths, addresses or secrets, as section 2.15 of our Privacy Policy describes. You can turn error reports off in the application's Settings › Privacy. Neither Google Analytics nor Cloudflare Web Analytics runs on /check or /newtab, the pages the application opens inside your profiles. Apart from the archives of profiles you sync or share (section 3.3), which we store but do not open, we do not collect browsing history or page content from inside profiles. Rate limiting on the API keys on IP address, account identifier or a hash of an email address, kept in our servers' memory for about an hour, and is not retained as a log of your activity. The profile activity history described in section 2.12 of our Privacy Policy is a product feature you and your team see; it is not telemetry.
3.10 Where data is processed
The Service is hosted on Railway (application and PostgreSQL) in the United States, with sync storage on Amazon Web Services S3 in us-east-1 and DNS and edge services from Cloudflare. Website analytics come from Cloudflare (Cloudflare Web Analytics) and, where it runs, Google (Google Analytics); section 2.11 of the Privacy Policy describes what each receives. Our emails (sign-in links, receipts, security notices and product news) are sent by JustEmails, a Velocity Digital Labs product. When you buy a proxy allocation in the marketplace, the relevant provider (DataImpulse or Oxylabs) receives a pseudonymous identifier derived from your account id so it can attach the allocation to you; we do not send your name or email. The full list of sub-processors and what each receives is in the Privacy Policy at /privacy.
3.11 Signed installers and updates
The Windows installer is code-signed by Velocity Digital Labs, LLC, and the macOS application is signed with our Apple Developer ID and notarized by Apple. From version 2.0 the application installs an update only after Windows or macOS confirms that signature. Windows SmartScreen may still warn while a new signature builds its reputation; the publisher it names is Velocity Digital Labs, LLC. Download installers only from justbrowser.app.
4. What we do not yet do
We would rather you learn these from us than discover them yourself.
- We have not had a third-party security audit or penetration test, and we hold no security certification (no SOC 2, ISO 27001 or similar). If you find an older page of ours that says otherwise, this page is correct and that page is out of date; tell us so we can fix it.
- We do not publish a PGP key, so we cannot receive encrypted vulnerability reports by email.
- We do not run a bug bounty programme.
- The local SQLite database on your computer is not encrypted as a whole (see section 3.2). Enable full-disk encryption on your machine if this matters to you.
- The activity history (section 3.8) is not a tamper-proof audit log: entries about what happened on a device are reported by the app on that device, and only while cloud sync is turned on there, and entries are kept for 12 months.
- We cannot change a shared profile's key. Everyone you share a profile with gets the same key, and it does not change when a share ends; anyone who had the profile could have copied what was in it. To lock someone out of the accounts in a profile, change those accounts' passwords and 2FA.
- The application's error reports tell us when the application itself fails, not what happens on your computer or in your profiles, so we cannot detect a security problem in the desktop application on your machine on our own. If you see something wrong, you have to tell us.
5. security.txt
We publish a machine-readable security.txt at https://justbrowser.app/.well-known/security.txt (RFC 9116). It repeats the reporting contact in section 2.1 and links back to this page. If the file and this page ever disagree, this page is authoritative until we correct the file.
6. Changes to this page
We will update this page when a control described here changes, when a control listed in section 4 is added, or when the disclosure process changes. We will post the updated version with a new date and, for changes that narrow what you may do or reduce your rights, notify account holders by email before they take effect. The date at the top shows the last revision. Material changes to how we handle your data are also reflected in the Privacy Policy at /privacy.
7. Contact
- Security vulnerabilities: security@justbrowser.app
- Privacy questions, data subject requests and account deletion: privacy@justbrowser.app
- Terms, abuse, refunds, legal notices and everything else: legal@justbrowser.app
- Postal: Velocity Digital Labs, LLC, 1111B S Governors Ave #52122, Dover, DE 19904, United States